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ABSTRACT 
Private Monitoring in Auctions* 
by Andreas Blume and Paul Heidhues 
We study collusion in repeated first-price auctions under the condition of 
minimal information release by the auctioneer. In each auction a bidder only 
learns whether or not he won the object. Bidders do not observe other bidders’ 
bids, who participates or who wins in case they are not the winner. We show 
that for large enough discount factors collusion can nevertheless be supported 
in the infinitely repeated game. While there is a unique Nash equilibrium in 
public strategies, in which bidders bid competitively in every period, there are 
simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that support bid rotation. Equilibria 
that either improve on bid rotation or satisfy the requirement of Bayesian 
perfection, but not both, are only slightly more complex. Our main result is the 
construction of perfect Bayesian equilibria that improve on bid rotation. These 
equilibria require complicated inferences off the equilibrium path. A deviator 
may not know who has observed his deviation and consequently may have an 
incentive to use strategic experimentation to learn about the bidding behavior of 
his rivals. 
 
Keywords:  tacit collusion, repeated auctions, supergames, contagion, bid-rotation, 
trigger strategies. 
JEL Classification:  C73, D44 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Privates Monitoring in Auktionen 
Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit Bieter Kollusion, bzw. stillschweigende 
Abkommen, in wiederholten Erstpreisauktionen aufrecht erhalten können, in 
welchen der Auktionator alle Informationen zurückhält. Nach jeder Auktion lernt 
ein Bieter nur, ob er das Objekt gewonnen hat oder nicht. Ein Bieter kann weder 
die Gebote der anderen Bieter beobachten, noch kann er beobachten, welche 
Bieter an der Auktion teilgenommen haben und wer gewonnen hat - solange er 
nicht selbst das Objekt erhält. Wir zeigen, dass in dem unendlich wiederholten 
Spiel für hinreichend geduldige Bieter Kollusion möglich ist. Es existiert zwar ein 
eindeutiges Gleichgewicht in öffentlichen Strategien, in welchem die Bieter in 
jeder Periode kompetitiv bieten, aber es gibt einfache Nash-Gleichgewichte in 
privaten Strategien, die Bieterrotation durchsetzen. Wir zeigen auch, dass 
Bieterrotation das Ergebnis eines perfekt bayesianischen Gleichgewichtes sein 
kann. Nash-Gleichgewichte, die höhere erwartete Gewinne als Bieterrotation 
erzielen, sind nur ein wenig komplexer. Das Hauptergebnis ist die Konstruktion 
von (essentiell) perfekt bayesianischen Gleichgewichten, welche höhere 
Gewinne als Bieterrotation erzielen. Nach Abweichungen vom 
Gleichgewichtspfad, müssen die Bieter in diesen Gleichgewichten komplizierte 
Rückschlüsse auf das Verhalten Ihrer Wettbewerber ziehen. So weiß ein Bieter 
nach bestimmten Abweichungen nicht, ob diese von seinen Mitspielern 
beobachtet wurden, und hat ein Interesse daran, durch strategisches 
experimentieren das Bietverhalten seiner Rivalen kennenzulernen. 
 
1 Introduction
Many resources are allocated through auctions and collusion in auctions is widespread.1
Experimental evidence as well as theoretical arguments support the intuitive belief that
collusion becomes harder if the auctioneer releases less information about bidders’ behavior in
the auction.2 Thus - unless there are other benefits from information release - the auctioneer
appears to have an incentive to suppress as much information as he can to fight collusion. We
say that the auctioneer withholds all information if after each auction each bidder has only
the information that cannot be concealed from him. In the case of the first-price auction
of an indivisible object, which we consider in this paper, the information that cannot be
concealed includes a bidder’s own value, his bid, and whether or not he received the object.
Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we will show that even by withholding all information, the
auctioneer cannot prevent collusion.
Collusion in first-price auctions with and without transfers has been analyzed by McAfee
and McMillan [1992] using a mechanism design framework. They assume that both the
identity and the bid of the winning bidder are publicly available information. To ensure
adherence to the rules of the mechanism, they appeal to repeated game effects, without
explicitly specifying a repeated game. Marshall and Marx [2002] study mechanisms that do
not use information provided by the auctioneer.
We study the effect of limiting information release on collusion in a repeated-game envi-
ronment. The same set of bidders repeatedly participates in a first-price auction for a single
object. Valuations are drawn independently across bidders and time. The literature on
repeated auctions, e.g. Aoyagi [2002a,2002b], Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [2002], and Blume
and Heidhues [2002] thus far has focused on studying perfect public equilibria under variety
of assumptions on communication among and information available to bidders. It follows
1For example, Froeb [1988] points out that 81% of all Sherman Act cases filed by the Department
of Justice between 1979 and 1988 involved auctions. Aoyagi [2002b] mentions that in 2001 alone, the
Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) issued warnings to 928 firms in thirty three collusion cases regarding
government procurement auctions. In all cases the warning was based on allegation that firms “collaborated
to predetermine a winning bidder.” Porter and Zona [1993] discuss bid rigging in procurement auctions.
Baldwin, Marshall and Richard [1997], Cassady [1967], Hendricks and Porter [1988], and Pesendorfer [1996]
report evidence on the occurrence of collusion in auctions for timber, antiques, fish, wool, oil drainage leases,
and school milk.
2See Dufwenberg and Gneezy [2002] and Marshall and Marx [2002].
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from standard results on repeated games (see Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994]) that in
similar environments approximately efficient collusion, where bidders pay an approximately
zero price and the good is allocated efficiently in every period, can be supported as a perfect
public equilibrium if bidders are sufficiently patient and the auctioneer reveals all informa-
tion that is available to him - i.e. all bids and the identities of the bidders who made them. In
contrast, we have shown elsewhere (Blume and Heidhues [2002]) that the payoffs from per-
fect public equilibria are bounded away from the efficient frontier for repeated second-price
auctions in which only the identity of each period’s winner is observed. In the present paper,
we permit bidders to condition behavior on information that is only privately observed.
In the extreme case, where the auctioneer withholds all information, it is easy to see
that given a unique equilibrium in the stage game, no collusion is supported by perfect
public equilibria. This raises the question of whether any collusion can be supported by
private equilibria, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategies that condition on more than
only publicly available information.
The dynamic programming techniques used to analyze games with imperfect public mon-
itoring such as in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti [1990] and Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin
[1994] are only of limited use in games with imperfect private monitoring, such as ours.
Indeed, sequential equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring are intri-
cate and have only recently been studied more carefully. One cannot exploit the recursive
structure of perfect public equilibria because off the equilibrium path continuation strategies
may not be Nash or even correlated equilibria of the continuation game.
Recent contributions on sustaining cooperation through private monitoring typically fo-
cus on a repeated prisoners’ dilemma in which each player observes a private signal of the
action chosen by his rival. Within such an environment, Bhaskar and Obara [2002] and Ely
and Va¨lima¨ki [2002] derive folk theorems. The differences between our paper and the above
literature are manifold: We consider an incomplete information stage game. The action
space in our underlying stage game is infinite. Auction rules provide a natural link between
the action profile and the monitoring technology in our environment. For example, a bidder
who does not bid receives no signal of his rivals’ behavior. The signal a player receives
depends only on his bid and the highest rival bid. This implies that a bidder cannot use
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the signaling technology to distinguish between rivals. The monitoring technology hence
distinguishes our paper from the above literature in which all distinct action profiles have
distinct signal distributions.
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to the literature on private monitoring games
with partial observability, e.g. Kandori [1992], Ellison [1994] and Ben-Porath and Kahneman
[1996]. A leading example, studied in Kandori’s seminal paper on social norms, is a random
matching game in which each player only observes what his opponents have done to him.
The main difference between our setting and the above literature is that partial observability
is not a feature of the exogenous environment (matching technology) in our model. Rather,
we choose strategies such that partial observability of payoff relevant deviations is ensured.
That is in equilibrium any deviation that yields a short term benefit is detected by some
rival with probability one. Once observed, the deviation initiates contagion as in Kandori
[1992] and Ellison [1994].
In the environment we study there is a stark contrast between the set of public equilibria
and the set of private equilibria. On the one hand, we show that the repeated game has
a unique public Nash equilibrium regardless of the discount factor. On the other hand,
with sufficiently patient bidders bid rotation can be supported as a private Nash equilibrium
in simple trigger strategies that induce contagion. Along similar lines one can construct
Nash equilibria that improve on bid rotation by permitting some players to choose to “trade
places” with other players in periods in which their valuation is relatively high. If it is
the case that the payoff from bid rotation exceeds the payoff from competitive bidding, one
can construct perfect Bayesian equilibria that support bid rotation. The construction relies
on a similar contagion argument as above, except that after observing a deviation bidders
revert to competitive bidding assuming that they are in an environment where they are
the last ones to have observed a deviation. Our central result is that improvements on bid
rotation can be supported by perfect Bayesian equilibria as well. Here the construction is
more subtle because after some histories bidders may find themselves in a situation where
they are uncertain about whom they bid against. Then they face a dynamic programming
problem similar to a monopolist who experiments with prices in order to learn about an
uncertain demand function, as for example in Rothschild [1974], McLennan [1984], Aghion,
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Bolton, Harris and Jullien [1991], and Mirman, Samuelson and Urbano [1993].
Our observation that in a repeated auction with limited observability, private equilibria
can lead to efficiency improvements over the set of public equilibria complements a similar
observation made by Kandori and Obara [2000] for repeated partnership games. Radner,
Myerson and Maskin [1986] had shown that for an example of such a game the folk theorem
fails. Among other things, Kandori and Obara show that for the same example private
strategies may attain efficiency.
2 Auctions Without Public Information Release
We consider the following repeated auction environment with n ≥ 3 bidders. Denote the
set of bidders by N. Bidders participate in an infinite sequence of auctions. Auctions are
for separate single objects that are indivisible. While many of our results extend to other
auction environments, we focus on first-price sealed-bid auctions. Before an auction in period
t each bidder i’s valuation vit is drawn from a distribution Fi with expected value v
e
i . All
these distributions have common support [0, vh], with continuously differentiable densities
fi that are bounded away from zero on [0, v
h]. Valuations are drawn independently across
bidders and time. Under these assumptions, there exists a unique equilibrium in the stage
game. In this equilibrium bidder i’s bid function is a strictly monotonically increasing and
differentiable function of vit. All bid functions have the same range with the lowest bid
being equal to the lowest valuation (see Athey [2001], Bajari [1997, 2001], Maskin and Riley
[1996], Lebrun [1999]). For the repeated auction game, we assume that all bidders are risk
neutral and have common discount factor δ. Hence bidder i’s (average) expected payoff in
the repeated auction equals
(1− δ)E
[ ∞∑
t=1
δt−1(vit − bit)1{bit is the winning bid in period t}
]
.
After each round bidders only observe whether they won that round or not. This structure
and the auction rules are common knowledge.
A private history hit = (h0, (vi,1, bi,1, wi,1), . . . , (vi,t−1, bi,t−1, wi,t−1)) begins with the null
history (“nothing has happened yet”) and further records for each of the first t− 1 periods
bidder i’s valuation vi,τ , his bid bi,τ and whether he won (wi,τ = 1) or lost (wi,τ = 0) in
4
period τ . Denote by Hit the set of all such histories and define Hi := ∪∞t=1Hit. A strategy
σi : Hi → {no bid} ∪ [0,∞) for player i maps private histories into bids.
We start by observing that no collusion is possible if bidders rely on public strategies
only.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique public Nash equilibrium. In this equilibrium bidders
bid competitively following every history.
Proof: A bidder’s behavior in any given period does not affect the public information in
future periods. Hence, a public Nash equilibrium strategy must maximize current payoffs
after every history. Therefore, a public Nash equilibrium strategy induces a stage-game
equilibrium after every history. The result follows because in our environment there is a
unique stage-game equilibrium. 2
The intuition for the above simple, yet strong, antifolk theorem is obvious: If there exists
no public information then bidders cannot collude on the basis of public information alone.3
It extends to other auction formats that have a unique stage game equilibrium. In an auction
format in which there are multiple stage game equilibria, bidders relying on public strategies
must play a stage game equilibrium in every period.
Next, we show that the bid-rotation outcome can always be sustained as a Nash equilib-
rium outcome if bidders use private strategies. The key insight is that along the equilibrium
path of a bid-rotation equilibrium, the only temptation a bidder faces is to submit a bid when
it is not his turn. If successful, however, this deviation will be observed with probability one
by the bidder whose turn it is to obtain the good. Following this deviation, the betrayed
bidder simply bids the highest possible value in all future periods and thereby eliminates all
future benefits from participating in the auction. Hence, for high enough discount factors,
no bidder wants to bid when it is not his turn. Observe that the partial observability of
payoff relevant deviations is a property of the collusive scheme the bidders adopt rather than
of the economic environment alone, which is the case in Kandori [1992].
3Note however that the time period is public information. In the second-price sealed-bid auction in which
there exists a continuum of equilibria (see Blume and Heidhues [2002]) bidders could use the time period to
coordinate on which stage game equilibrium to play. In particular, bidders could enforce bid rotation as a
perfect public equilibrium by designating a winner for each time period who bids above the highest possible
valuation while all other bidders refrain from bidding in that time-period.
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Proposition 2 There exists a Nash equilibrium that supports bid rotation for sufficiently
high discount factors.
Proof: Number bidders from 1 to n. Along the equlibrium path bidder j bids 0 in periods
τ ≡ j mod n and refrains from submitting a bid in all other periods. Any bidder who detects
a deviation, i.e. does not win when it is his turn, bids vh forever after. 2
While the above private strategies are simple, they rely on out-of-equilibrium threats
that are not sequentially optimal. We will address this issue below when we show that bid
rotation can be sustained as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome.
Before doing so, however, observe that the above construction can be generalized to allow
for a commonly known reserve price r as long as vei − r > 0 for all bidders. This condition
ensures that a bidder who does not know his realized value is willing to pay r for the right
to receive the object. Along the equilibrium path, bidder i bids r+  in periods τ ≡ i mod n
for some sufficiently small . In periods τ ≡ i + 1 mod n he randomizes uniformly over the
interval [r, r+], and he refrains from bidding otherwise. Any bidder who detects a deviation,
i.e. does not win when it is his turn to win or wins when it is his turn to randomize over the
interval [r, r + ], bids vh forever after.4 Note that this construction also handles the case
in which bidders are forced to submit a bid. Furthermore, it can be adopted to allow for
randomly drawn reserve prices that are announced at the beginning of each period, as long
as the expected future reserve price is low enough. Similarly, a scheme like this works if the
reserve price is randomly drawn in each period and only announced after the auction.
We prove next that there exists a collusive scheme that ensures that bidders receive a
higher payoff than the payoff from bid rotation. This result is perhaps somewhat surprising
as McAfee and McMillan [1992] have shown that bid rotation is the optimal static collusive
scheme in the absence of side-payments.5 Bid rotation is an extreme collusive scheme in that
it reduces bidders’ payments to zero at the cost of any allocative efficiency from assigning the
good to the bidder with the highest value. In a dynamic environment in which the winners’
4The randomization over the interval [r, r+], sometimes referred to as aggressive mixing, is the continuous
action space analog to undercutting ones rival by the smallest bid increment. Its been used, for example, in
Hirschleifer and Riley (1992).
5Indeed, McAfee and McMillan conjectured that this would also be true in a dynamic environment.
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identity is announced, Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [2002] have constructed a perfect public
equilibrium in which bidders use continuation values as implicit side-payments in order to
obtain a higher payoff than the payoff from bid-rotation.6 The side-payment is established
by ensuring that, in equilibrium, a bidder who obtains the good in the current period is less
likely to win the object in future periods. In general, one may expect this to be considerably
harder if bidders have to rely on private monitoring.
We solve this problem by starting with the above bid-rotation scheme and introducing a
simple (bilateral) trading scheme that is mutually beneficial for the participants and retains
the property that payoff relevant deviations are partially observable. The trading scheme
works as follows: Select two bidders i and i+ 1. All bidders j 6= i, i+ 1 behave exactly as in
the bid-rotation scheme. Furthermore, in all periods other than i and i + 1, bidders i and
i+1 behave as in the bid rotation scheme. In contrast to the bid-rotation scheme, however,
bidder i gets the right to choose whether he wants the good in period i or in period i+1. In
particular, if bidder i has a low value in period i he chooses to wait and obtain the good in
period i+ 1 instead, which makes him better of. Bidder i+ 1 has the chance of getting the
good in an earlier period, which makes him better of as he discounts the future.
To implement this trading scheme, bidder i + 1 bids 0 in period i and bidder i bids
slightly above zero if he chooses to take the good in period i rather than i + 1. Obviously,
a technical issue arises as there is no lowest bid above 0. To circumvent this problem, we
permit a bidder to submit a bid b = 0+, which is identical to a bid b = 0 except that it
wins the object if the highest competing bid is zero. We view this as innocuous, because in
reality every currency is discrete and we use continuity of possible bids as a modeling device
to facilitate the analysis. As the fact that no lowest higher bid exists makes the analysis
more complicated and in our view misleading, we extend the model to allow for bids to take
the value 0+.7 If bidder i decided to trade places by not bidding in period i, then he bids 0
6Athey and Bagwell [2001] point out the usefulness of future market shares as implicit side-payments in an
infinitely repeated Bertrand game. Their setup resembles a procurement auction with private observations
of costs.
7Alternatively, one could view the tie-breaking rule as part of the equilibrium concept. This has been
proposed by Jackson, Simon, Swinkels, and Zame [2002] for games with discontinuous payoffs such as ours.
They argue that an endogenous tie-breaking rule allows one to interpret the idealization of a continuous
action space as the limit of finer and finer discrete action spaces through ensuring the existence of best
replies and, hence, equilibrium. In our case, a tie-breaking rule which specifies that bidder i gets the good if
multiple bidders bid zero in period i would also allow one to use the proposed trading scheme in equilibrium.
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in period i+1. Otherwise, bidder i+1 did not obtain the good in period i, and in this case
bidder i+ 1 claims the good in period i+ 1 by bidding 0.
In the above construction, the only temptation a bidder faces is to bid for the good when
it is not his turn. But any such deviation is detected within two periods with probability 1.
(Consider for example a bidder j 6= i, i+ 1 who submits a bid in period i and wins. In case
bidder i chose to trade and not bid in period i, this deviation is not detected immediately.
In the next period, however, both bidder i and i + 1 will bid 0 and expect to win. At least
one of these two bidders loses and thereby detects that a deviation occurred.) Once a bidder
detects a deviation, he simply bids vh forever after and thereby eliminates all future benefits
for all bidders. Thus any sufficiently patient bidder does not want to deviate.
The collusive scheme is just one simple example on how bidders can beat bid rotation. It
is easy to improve on this scheme by repeatedly allowing for the above type of bilateral trade.
Furthermore, it is easy to think of multilateral trades that may further increase efficiency.
Proposition 3 There exists a Nash equilibrium in which each bidder’s expected payoff ex-
ceeds the payoff from bid rotation for sufficiently high discount factors.
Proof: Number bidders from 1 to n. Randomly select a bidder i. In case i = n, denote
bidder 1 as bidder i+1. We formulate strategies with respect to a path of play. On the path
of play, bidders behave as follows. Bidders j 6= i, i+ 1 bid zero in periods τ ≡ j mod n and
refrain from submitting a bid in periods τ 6≡ j mod n. Bidder i+1 bids zero in period i, does
not submit a bid in period i+ 1 if he won the object in period i, bids zero in period i+ 1 if
he lost in period i, bids zero in periods τ ≡ i+1 mod n, τ 6= i+1 and does not submit a bid
in all other periods. Bidder i bids 0+ in period i if vi,i ≥ δvei , refrains from bidding in period
i if vi,i < δv
e
i , bids zero in period i + 1 if he did not submit a bid or lost in period i with a
zero bid, does not submit a bid in period i + 1 if he won in period i, bids zero in periods
τ ≡ i mod n, τ 6= i and does not bid in all other periods. Each bidder’s strategy specifies to
bid consistent with this path of play unless he observed a deviation from this path of play
in some prior period. A bidder who observed a deviation bids vh.
First note that conditional on the outcome of the randomization, the expected payoff of
bidder i and i + 1 induced by the above strategy profile are higher than their payoff under
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bid-rotation for the following reasons: Because values are independent across players and
time, bidder i + 1’s expected contemporary value is the same in period i and i + 1, and he
thus benefits because with positive probability he obtains the good earlier. If bidder i always
submitted a bid in period i his payoff would be identical to the payoff from bid-rotation.
However, he chooses to wait in period i+ 1 whenever this increases his expected payoff and
therefore he is better off. Furthermore, it easy to check that no bidder can gain by deviating
for sufficiently high discount factors. 2
We now argue that bid rotation can be sustained as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
outcome,8 if for all bidders the payoff from bid rotation, having a 1
n
chance of getting the
object for free, exceeds the payoff from competitive bidding, i.e. each bidder using the bid
function of the unique equilibrium of the stage game.9
The equilibrium is a slight modification of the collusive scheme introduced in Proposition
2. Along the equilibrium path behavior is identical to our earlier scheme and therefore induces
partial observability of payoff relevant deviations. A bidder who submits a bid and wins the
object when it it is not his turn initiates competitive bidding in a contagious fashion. After
the first deviation at least two bidders (the deviator and the bidder who lost when it was
his turn to win) are aware of the fact that a deviation occurred. The correctly anticipate
each other to submit a positive bid in all following periods. Hence no bidder can unilaterally
deviate and stop or slow down the contagious process as all following bidders who submit a
zero bid when it is their turn to win will lose. Within n periods, all bidders bid competitively.
More specifically, bidders who observe a deviation, i.e. do not win when it is their turn,
have pessimistic beliefs: They believe that a deviation occurred as early as possible. That is
either in the first period or in the period following their last win (a bidder who wins when
submitting a zero bid knows that no deviation has occurred so far). Given these pessimistic
beliefs and ignoring the first n periods, they bid competitively as soon as they observe a
deviation thinking that all other bidders are already engaged in competitive bidding. In
the first n − 1 periods bidders believe that bidder n deviated and submitted a bid in the
first period. From this belief they can deduce which rivals they are facing and they use the
8A pair (σ, µ) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium if the strategy profile σ induces a best response after
every history given a player’s belief and beliefs µ are updated according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
9McAfee and McMillan [1992] show that if all bidders draw their valuations from the same distribution
F this assumption is satisfied provided that 1− F (v) is log-concave.
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static equilibrium bid function of the corresponding game. We show that these beliefs are
consistent after the proposition.10
A bidder who deviates knows that he initiates competitive bidding. In equilibrium, he
knows how many rivals he faces in every period and which bid functions his rivals use.
Furthermore, once he deviated, he knows that he cannot affect the speed with which the
contagion spreads. He thus simply plays a myopic best response to his rivals bidding be-
havior. The following lemma makes the technical observation that this best response always
exists. Denote the set of bidders by N. For any subset M ⊂ N refer to the one-shot auction
in which M is the set of participants as the M -auction.
Lemma 1 Let M ⊂ N \ {i}. Suppose all bidders j ∈M use the equilibrium bid-function of
the M-auction. Then there exists a best response for bidder i.
Proof: Note that bidder i’s probability of winning the object is a continuous function of his
bid if all bidders j ∈M use the equilibrium bid-function of the one-shot M -bidder auction.
Hence, his expected payoff is a continuous function of his bid. Clearly, it is never a best
response to bid above the highest possible valuation. Hence, bidder i maximizes a continuous
function over a compact set and thus a maximum exists by Weierstrass’ theorem. 2
To characterize bidder i’s equilibrium strategy it is useful to partition the set of his
private histories into three subsets: (i) cooperative histories, denoted H0it, after which the
bidder has no evidence that a deviation occurred (Following these histories the bidder plays
according to the bid-rotation scheme.); (ii) histories, denoted H1it, in which he observed
someone else taking the good when it was his turn to win (Following these histories, the
bidder bids competitively.); and, (iii) histories, denoted H2it, in which he himself has deviated
and obtained the good when it was not his turn (After these histories he plays a myopic
best-response to the rivals he is facing.). We want to emphasize that while bidders have to
rely on private strategies to sustain bid-rotation, the strategies are appealingly simple. In
essence, bidders use trigger strategies.
10More precisely, while the formal definition of sequential equilibrium by Kreps and Wilson [1982] does
not apply to games with uncountable action spaces such as ours, we argue below that these beliefs satisfy
the spirit of their consistency requirement.
10
Number bidders from 1 to n. Let n(t) := min{t, n}. We say that bidder j uses the n(t)-
competitive bid function if he uses his equilibrium bid function for the one-shot auction with
bidders in the set {1, . . . , n(t)− 1} ∪ {n}. For any s < s, s, s ∈ IN, let S(s, s) := {j ∈ N |t ≡
j mod n for some t ∈ {s, . . . , s− 1}}.
Proposition 4 Suppose that for each bidder the expected payoff from bid rotation exceeds
the expected payoff from competitive bidding. Then, bid rotation can be sustained as the
outcome of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium for sufficiently high discount factors.
Proof:
Partition the set of private histories hit of bidder i that precede period t as follows. Let
H0it be the set of all hit such that for all periods τ < t in which τ ≡ i mod n bidder i either
won or did not bid, and for all periods τ < t in which τ 6≡ i mod n he either did not bid or
lost. Let H1θit be the set of all hit such that there exists θ < t with θ ≡ i mod n, hiθ ∈ H0iθ,
bidder i submitted a bid in period θ and lost in period θ. Let H2θit be the set of all hit such
that there exists θ < t with θ 6≡ i mod n, hiθ ∈ H0iθ, bidder i submitted a bid in period θ and
won.
Bidder i uses the following strategy:
1. In any period t with hit ∈ H0it and t ≡ i mod n, bid zero.
2. In any period t with hit ∈ H0it and t 6≡ i mod n, do not submit a bid.
3. In any period t with hit ∈ H1θit , use the n(t)-competitive bid function.
4. In any period t with hit ∈ H2θit , use a myopic best response against all bidders j ∈
S(θ, t) \ {i} using the n(t)-competitive bid function. This best response exists by
Lemma 1.
Whenever possible bidder i’s beliefs are given by Bayes’ rule. This is the case for all hit ∈
H0it in which bidder i has no evidence that someone else has deviated from the postulated
strategy. The only histories hit ∈ H0it in which he does have such evidence are those in which
in some period τ < t with τ 6≡ i mod n he submitted a bid b > 0 and lost. In that case we
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assume that he believes that the bidder j for whom τ ≡ j mod n bid above b and won and
any bidder k 6= j, i did not submit a bid.
Following any history hit ∈ H1θit with θ ≥ n, bidder i believes that bidder j with θ + 1 ≡
j mod n lost in period θ + 1 − n to some bidder k 6= i, j. Following any history hit ∈ H1θit
with θ < n, he believes that bidder 1 lost in the first period because bidder n submitted a
bid.
Following any history hit ∈ H2θit bidder i’s beliefs can be derived from Bayes’ rule for
any bid b by bidder i in period t − 1 that is in the range of the n(t − 1)-competitive bid
functions. Provided bidder i won, Bayes’ rule also applies if b is above the range of the
n(t− 1)-competitive bid functions. Otherwise assume that bidder i believes that one of the
bidders in the set S(θ, t− 1) \ {i} bid above him.
It remains to show that bidder i’s strategy is optimal after every history given his beliefs.
After any history hit ∈ H0it given his beliefs, bidder i expects that every other bidder j
continues to bid 0 in periods τ with τ ≡ j mod n and abstains from bidding in other periods,
unless i submits a bid in a period τ with τ 6≡ i mod n and wins. Thus, given any  > 0, by
following his prescribed strategy, for sufficiently high δ bidder i obtains a payoff -close to
the bid-rotation payoff whereas by deviating he induces competitive bidding in no more than
n periods. For large δ the contribution to average payoffs from the first n periods following
a deviation goes to zero. Thus deviations are not profitable following histories hit ∈ H0it.
After any history hit ∈ H1θit bidder i expects that the other bidders use the n(τ)-
competitive bid function for τ ≥ t regardless of his own bidding behavior in period t. Hence
it is optimal for him to use the n(t)-competitive bid function in period t, since it is a myopic
best reply.
After any history hit ∈ H2θit , given his beliefs, for τ ≥ t bidder i expects that bidders
in the set S(θ, τ) \ {i} use the n(τ)-competitive bid function regardless of his own bidding
behavior in period t. Hence, it is optimal for him to use a myopic best response against
bidders j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {i} using the n(t)-competitive bid function. 2
While the definition of sequential equilibria by Kreps and Wilson [1982] does not apply
to our game, we capture the idea that consistent beliefs are derived as the limit of totally
mixed strategy profiles as follows: Consider any distribution function F˜ that puts positive
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probability on every subinterval [0,∞) and has a finite mean. For each bidder i, let σi()
be constructed as follows: After any history hit ∈ H0it, bidder i draws a bid from F˜ with
probability t in periods t ≡ i mod n and with probability n+t in periods t 6≡ i mod n and
t > 1. In period 1, let bidder n draw a bid from F˜ with n+1 and let bidders i 6= 1, n draw a
bid from F˜ with probability n+2. After any history hit 6∈ H0it, let bidder i draw a bid from F˜
with probability . Otherwise, let every bidder bid as prescribed by the equilibrium strategy
σ. For the profile σ() beliefs µ() can be derived from Bayes’ rule after every private history.
Taking the limit of those beliefs as → 0, gives our belief system.
Next, we augment the construction of Proposition 4 to allow two bidders to engage in
the same trade that we used in Proposition 3. Incentives to cooperate are again given by
the threat of reversion to the static Nash equilibrium. An additional complication arises,
however, because there exist unprofitable deviations in the trading periods that will only
be detected with probability less than 1. Following such a deviation, a bidder is uncertain
as to whether his rivals reverted back to competitive bidding or still bid according to the
bid-rotation scheme. After one such deviation a bidder has an incentive to mimic coopera-
tive behavior for high enough discount factors in the hope that his deviation has not been
detected. If this bidder, however, continues to deviate, the problem of assigning optimal
continuation behavior becomes exceedingly difficult and we cannot prove the existence of an
optimal continuation strategy following every possible private history. Nevertheless, as it is
easy to show that such deviations are unprofitable in the first place - independent of the be-
havior the bidder adopts following these histories - we view this as a technical difficulty that
arises due to the fact that we have a continuous action space. A practical problem to specify
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium also arises: As the optimal behavior in any given period may
depend on the entire private history of a player, it is an enormous and tedious task to keep
track of all possible histories. We circumvent this problem by relaxing the solution concept
and allowing bidders to use suboptimal continuation strategies following irrelevant histories.
We formalize this idea, which might prove useful more generally in analyzing games with
private monitoring, next.
Let H be a subset of the set of private histories such that if h 6∈ H then h′ 6∈ H for any
continuation history h′ of h. For any strategy profile σ define Σ˜(σ,H) as the set of strategy
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profiles that coincide with σ on H. Denote by H the complement of H.
Definition 1 A triple (σ, µ,H) is an essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE) if:
1. H contains all histories that are reached on the path of play of σ.
2. σ induces a best response against any σ˜ ∈ Σ˜(σ,H) after every history in H given the
system of beliefs µ.
3. Beliefs µ are derived from Bayes’ rule whenever possible.
When convenient, we will simply refer to the profile σ as an EPBE without explicitly
mentioning the system beliefs µ and the set of histories H.
For finite games EPBE and PBE outcomes coincide. Trivially, any PBE is an EPBE
in which H contains all histories. Now consider any EPBE strategy profile σ of the finite
game Γ. To show that there exists a PBE that yields the same outcome, we first construct
an induced game Γ′ as follows: Let Γ′ be identical to Γ, except that for all histories h ∈ H, the
probability distribution over the possible actions according to σ is implemented by nature.
Because the induced game Γ′ is finite, it has a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Now consider the
strategy profile σ′ that for all histories h ∈ H coincides with σ and for all others prescribes
the same behavior as the PBE of the induced game. This strategy profile together with an
appropriate set of beliefs µ constitutes a PBE because all choices following histories h ∈ H
are optimal independent of the choices taken following all other histories and the choices
following all other histories are optimal for the beliefs of the PBE of the induced game.
Much of the literature on repeated games with private monitoring exploits a fundamental
insight developed in Sekiguchi [1997]. He observed that in repeated games with finite action
and signaling spaces in which the distribution of private signals has full support independent
of the action profile chosen, the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and the set of sequential
equilibrium outcomes coincide. His insight can be interpreted in our framework by observing
that all histories following a deviation by a given player are irrelevant, i.e. can be placed
into H. More precisely, any Nash equilibrium σ in this environment is an EPBE in which H
is the set of histories reached on the path of play. The reason is that player i cannot reach
histories in Hj, j 6= i. Hence, the specification of behavior after those histories is irrelevant
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for his decisions. The full-support condition ensures that for players j 6= i, the histories that
player i can reach by way of a deviation remain in Hj.
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In games with infinite action spaces, EPBE and PBE outcomes do not have to coincide.
Consider the decision problem illustrated in Figure 1. At the first decision node player I can
decide whether to get a payoff of 2 by choosing l or whether to advance to the second period.
In the second period, the player can choose any x ∈ (0, 1). His payoff is identical to his
choice of x. Observe that this decision problem has no PBE outcome as there is no optimal
action in the second period. The choice of l in the first period, however, can be sustained as
an EPBE outcome. The reason is that it is better than any action the player may take in
the second period. Clearly in this example, EPBE captures the essence of perfection and
predicts the appropriate outcome. The careful reader will observe that we use EPBE to
eliminate potential openness problems of this kind in the equilibrium construction below.11
In the remainder of the paper, we prove that there exists an EPBE-outcome with higher
expected payoffs than the payoffs from bid-rotation (as long as bid-rotation yields higher
payoffs than competitive bidding). The central idea is straightforward: Following any history
hit ∈ H0it in which a bidder has no evidence that a deviation occurred, he bids as in the
11Observe that the Nash equilibrium profile constructed in the proof of Proposition 2 (and 3) is not an
EPBE. The reason is as follows: Consider any private history hθit in which bidder i has observed a deviation
in period θ and is assigned to bid vh in period t > θ. Given that no one ever bids above vh, bidding vh is
not a best response in the continuation game following any hit because bidder i risks obtaining the object
with positive probability at a price above his value. Therefore hθit 6∈ H, ∀ t > θ. Now consider the strategy
profile σ˜, which differs from σ only in that bidder i refrains from bidding after any history hθit. Given this
strategy profile σ˜, it is profitable to deviate and submit a bid in θ. Therefore σ is not a EPBE for any set H.
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collusive scheme with a bilateral trade that we introduced in Proposition 3.12 Following
histories hit ∈ H1it in which a bidder observed a deviation and lost when he was supposed to
win, bidders revert to bidding competitively. Loosely speaking, bidders have the same type
of pessimistic beliefs as introduced in Proposition 4. As before, the threat of Nash reversion
makes deviations unprofitable.
Off the equilibrium path, however, a bidder who deviated himself may face complicated
decision problems that require strategic experimentation. Consider, for example, a bidder
who is not involved in the bilateral trade and deviates in the second “trading period.” The
deviator knows that his deviation has been detected and initiates contagion, but he does
not know which of the bidders involved in the trade detected his deviation. n periods after
his deviation, all bidders will have detected his deviation and bid competitively thereafter.
In the meantime, however, it is in general useful for the deviator to know which rivals he
faces as they may use different bid functions. When submitting a zero bid (or a bid above
the range of the competitive bid function), the deviator loses (wins) with probability one
independent of which rivals he faces. For all other bids, however, his probability of losing
may depend on which bidder detected his deviation. He therefore updates his beliefs as to
which rivals he faces after every round. When bidding, the deviator thus has to trade off
the effect of his bids on his contemporaneous profits with the expected informational value
his bid generates. In particular, this implies that the optimal behavior within the first n
periods following his initial deviation depends not only on the first time the bidder deviated
but also on the exact bids he submitted in the meantime, because these bids can affect his
beliefs about which rival he is facing. This already indicates the necessity of keeping track
of histories in a far more detailed fashion.
As another example, consider a bidder i + 1 who is meant to bid 0 in the first trading
period and obtain the good only if his trading partner prefers to get the good in the second
period. In the out-of-equilibrium event in which he submits a positive bid in the first trading
period, he is uncertain about whether his deviation has been detected. For high enough
discount factors, it is optimal for him to refrain from bidding in subsequent periods in which
the good is assigned to his rivals in the hope that his deviation has not been detected and
12For notational simplicity we consider trade between bidders 1 and 2. The argument generalizes straight-
forwardly to any randomly selected pair of bidder.
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that he will continue to enjoy the benefits of the bid-rotation scheme. When it is his turn
to bid according to the bid-rotation scheme, he can submit a zero bid; in this case he knows
for certain that his deviation has been detected if he loses and that he has not been caught
if he wins. Nevertheless, if he has a high value, he may prefer to submit a positive bid
because this increase his chance of winning in case his rivals bid competitively. Bidder i+ 1
needs to balance this contemporaneous profit effect with the informational value his bid
generates. Note that bidder i + 1 faces a similar issue every n periods when it is his turn
to win until he either loses or wins with a zero bid. He thus has to solve an infinite horizon
strategic experimentation problem. The problem becomes even more delicate if bidder i+ 1
continued to deviate, repeatedly submitted zero bids when it was not his turn to win, and
lost. After every bid he has to update his beliefs as to whether his deviation has been
detected and if he repeatedly loses with zero bids, he may think that it is extremely likely
that he has been detected earlier (his beliefs also depend on the exact bids he submitted
when it was his turn to win). Rather than trying to solve all the different types of strategic
experimentation problems that can arise following repeated deviations by bidder i + 1, we
group these histories into the setH of irrelevant histories because - no matter how he behaves
following these histories - it is easy to show that it is unprofitable for him to deviate in the
first place. Similar issues arise if bidder i + 1 deviates in period i by not submitting a bid
and then deviates again and submits a winning bid in period i + 1, because in this case he
initiated contagion if and only if bidder i decided to obtain the good in period i + 1 rather
than in period i. Due to the same uncertainty as to whether or not he initiated contagion, he
must solve similar strategic experimentation problems. In the proof below we fully specify
sequentially rational and consistent strategies for all bidders j 6= i + 1 and restrict the use
of H to the type of histories discussed above. Observe also that bidder i + 1’s rivals never
become aware of the fact that bidder i “deviated himself” into the set of irrelevant histories.
Proposition 5 Suppose that for each bidder the expected payoff from bid rotation exceeds the
expected payoff from competitive bidding. Then, there exists an essentially perfect Bayesian
equilibrium outcome with higher payoffs than from bid rotation for sufficiently high discount
factors.
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3 Conclusion
We constructed a simple collusive scheme that allows bidders to support bid-rotation in
repeated first-price auctions even if the auctioneer withholds all possible information. Our
result highlights the contrast between studying collusion through the repeated game approach
employed in the current paper and the static mechanism design framework used in McAfee
and McMillan [1992]. Following this approach, Marshall and Marx [2002] have shown that
bid-rotation cannot be sustained by mechanisms that do not rely on information provided by
the auctioneer. The contrast in results can be explained by the fact that in our repeated game
environment equilibrium strategies can ensure partial observability of potentially profitable
deviations even if the auctioneer withholds all possible information. One lesson of this paper
is thus that the information available to colluding players in a repeated game framework
depends itself on the equilibrium strategies employed. In addition, we illustrated how a
simple bilateral trade can be used in equilibrium to improve on the bid-rotation outcome.
This, again, is in contrast to the static mechanism design framework in which McAfee and
McMillan [1992] have shown that bid-rotation is the optimal form of collusion in the absence
of explicit sidepayments under weak distributional assumptions.
Our analysis also highlights the important difference between studying collusion through
perfect public equilibria and through perfect Bayesian equilibria. Bidders relying on pub-
lic strategies cannot collude at all in our framework. Often restricting attention to public
strategies is defended as focusing on relatively simple strategies. Simple collusive schemes
that employ private strategies, however, allow the bidders to improve on competitive bid-
ding in our setting. When constructing a perfect Bayesian equilibrium that improves upon
bid-rotation, one needs to investigate complicated dynamic programming problems of the
equilibrium path. Nevertheless, we think of the collusive scheme as extraordinarily simple
from the participants perspective because the required behavior along the equilibrium path
is simple and the collusive scheme is supported through the straightforward threat of Nash
reversion. Furthermore, it is easy to foresee for every bidder that a deviation from the equi-
librium behavior is unprofitable - independent of the behavior he adopts following such an
initial deviation. In addition, his behavior following certain deviations does not affect how
his rivals play in the continuation game and it is thus unnecessary to assign optimal behavior
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after such deviations in order to predict the outcome of the game. From a methodological
point of view, we introduced the concept of essentially perfect Bayesian equilibria, which
allows a researcher to capture the spirit of the perfection refinement without the cost of
having to specify behavior following such irrelevant histories.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof: We first partition the set of histories, then describe strategies in terms of this
partition, then describe bidders’ beliefs and finally show that the strategies are optimal
given the specified beliefs. The reader may want to consult Figures 2-8 while reading the
proof. Those figures graphically represent the partitions of private histories that we employ
in the proof. To save space, the figures only deal with the smallest interesting number
of bidders, which is three but are easily adapted to the general case of n bidders that is
addressed in the proof.
Histories
For bidders i = 3, . . . , n, partition their sets of private histories hit that precede period t
as follows. Let H0it be the set of all hit such that for all periods τ < t in which τ ≡ i mod n
bidder i either won or did not bid, and for all periods τ < t in which τ 6≡ i mod n he either
did not bid or lost. Let H1θit be the set of all hit such that there exists θ < t with θ ≡ i mod n,
hiθ ∈ H0iθ, bidder i submitted a bid in period θ and lost in period θ. Let H2θit be the set of
all hit such that there exists θ < t with θ 6≡ i mod n, hiθ ∈ H0iθ, bidder i submitted a bid in
period θ and won.
For bidder 1, partition his set of private histories h1t that precede period t as follows. For
t ≤ n + 1, let H01t be the set of all h1t such that in period 1 bidder 1 either won or did not
bid, and for all periods τ < t other than period 1 he either did not bid or lost. For t = n+2,
let H
0,grab
1t be the set of all h1t such that h1,t−1 ∈ H01,t−1 and bidder 1 submitted a winning
bid in period n+ 1. For t = n+ 3, let H
0,grab
1t be the set of all h1t such that h1,t−1 ∈ H0,grab1,t−1
and bidder 1 either abstained from bidding in period n+2 or lost. For t > n+3, let H
0,grab
1t
be the set of all h1t such that h1,t−1 ∈ H0,grab1,t−1 and if t − 1 ≡ 1 mod n bidder 1 either won
or did not bid in period t− 1 and if t− 1 6≡ 1 mod n he either did not bid or lost in period
20
t− 1.
For t = n + 2, let H0,leave1t be the set of all h1t such that h1,t−1 ∈ H01,t−1 and bidder 1
refrained from bidding in period n+ 1 or bid b = 0 in period n+ 1 and lost. For t = n+ 3,
let H0,leave1t be the set of all h1t such that h1,t−1 ∈ H0,leave1,t−1 and bidder 1 either won in period
n + 2 or abstained from bidding. For t > n + 3, let H0,leave1t be the set of all h1t such that
h1,t−1 ∈ H0,leave1,t−1 and if t − 1 ≡ 1 mod n bidder 1 either won or did not bid in period t − 1
and if t − 1 6≡ 1 mod n he either did not bid or lost in period t − 1. For t ≥ n + 2, let
H01t = H
0,grab
1t ∪H0,leave1t .
Let H1θ1t be the set of all h1t such that either (i) there exists a θ < t with θ 6= n + 1,
θ ≡ 1 mod n, h1θ ∈ H01θ, and bidder 1 submitted a losing bid in period θ or (ii) bidder 1
submitted a bid b 6= 0 in period θ = n+1 and lost or (iii) bidder 1 submitted a bid in period
θ = n+ 2 for a history h1,n+2 ∈ H0,leave1,n+2 and lost.
Let H2θ1t be the set of all h1t such that there exists θ < t for which h1θ ∈ H01θ, and either
(i) θ 6= n+2, θ 6≡ 1 mod n, and bidder 1 submitted a winning bid in period θ or (ii) θ = n+2,
and bidder 1 submitted a winning bid in period θ following h1θ ∈ H0,grab1θ .
For bidder 2, partition his set of private histories h2t that precede period t as follows. For
t ≤ n + 1, let H02t be the set of all h2t such that in period 2 bidder 2 either won or did not
bid, and for all periods τ < t other than period 2 he either did not bid or lost. For t = n+2,
let H
0,grab
2t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H02,t−1 and bidder 2 submitted a losing bid
b ≥ 0 in period n+1. For t = n+3, let H0,grab2t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,grab2,t−1
and bidder 2 submitted a bid and won or refrained from bidding. For t > n+ 3, let H
0,grab
2t
be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,grab2,t−1 and if t − 1 ≡ 2 mod n bidder 2 either won
or did not bid in period t− 1 and if t− 1 6≡ 2 mod n he either did not bid or lost in period
t− 1.
For t = n + 2, let H0,leave2t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H02,t−1 and bidder 2
submitted a winning bid b = 0 in period n+1. For t = n+3, let H0,leave2t be the set of all h2t
such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,leave2,t−1 and bidder 2 abstained from bidding in period n+2 or submitted
a losing bid. For t > n+ 3, let H0,leave2t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,leave2,t−1 and if
t − 1 ≡ 2 mod n bidder 2 either won or did not bid in period t − 1 and if t − 1 6≡ 2 mod n
he either did not bid or lost in period t− 1.
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For t = n + 2, let H0,∅2t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H02,t−1 and bidder 2
refrained from bidding in period n+1. For t = n+3, let H0,∅2t be the set of all h2t such that
h2,t−1 ∈ H0,∅2,t−1 and bidder 2 abstained from bidding in period n+2 or submitted a losing bid.
For t > n + 3, let H0,∅2t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,∅2,t−1 and if t− 1 ≡ 2 mod n
bidder 2 either won or did not bid in period t− 1 and if t− 1 6≡ 2 mod n he either did not
bid or lost in period t− 1.
For t = n + 3, let H0,∅,22t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,∅2,t−1 and bidder 2
submitted a winning bid in period n + 2. For t > n + 3, let H0,∅,22t be the set of all h2t such
that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,∅,22,t−1 and if t− 1 ≡ 2 mod n bidder 2 either won with a bid b > 0 or did not
bid in period t− 1 and if t− 1 6≡ 2 mod n he did not bid in period t− 1. Let H0,∅,02t be the
set of all h2t such that (i) there exists a θ with h2,θ ∈ H0,∅,22,θ , θ ≡ 2 mod n, and bidder 2 won
with a bid b = 0 and (ii) for all τ = θ, . . . , t − 1 if τ ≡ 2 mod n bidder 2 either won or did
not bid in period τ and if τ 6≡ 2 mod n he either did not bid or lost in period τ . Any history
h2t for which there exists a θ such that h2,θ ∈ H0,∅,22,θ , θ 6≡ 2 mod n, and bidder 2 submitted
a losing bid b = 0 belongs to the complement of H denoted by H.
For t = n+2, let H0,22t be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H02,t−1 and bidder 2 submitted
a winning bid b 6= 0 in period n + 1. For t = n + 3, let H0,22t be the set of all h2t such that
h2,t−1 ∈ H0,22,t−1 and bidder 2 abstained from bidding in period n+ 2. For t > n+ 3, let H0,22t
be the set of all h2t such that h2,t−1 ∈ H0,22,t−1 and if t−1 ≡ 2 mod n bidder 2 either won with
a bid b > 0 or did not bid in period t−1 and if t−1 6≡ 2 mod n he did not bid in period t−1.
Let H0,2,02t be the set of all h2t such that (i) there exists a θ with h2,θ ∈ H0,22,θ , θ ≡ 2 mod n and
θ 6= n+ 2, and bidder 2 won with a bid b = 0 and (ii) for all τ = θ, . . . , t− 1 if τ ≡ 2 mod n
bidder 2 either won or did not bid in period τ and if τ 6≡ 2 mod n he either did not bid or lost
in period τ . Any history h2t for which there exists a θ such that h2,θ ∈ H0,22,θ , θ 6≡ 2 mod n or
θ = n+ 2 and bidder 2 submitted a losing bid b = 0 belongs to the set H.
For t ≥ n+ 2, let H02t = H0,grab2t ∪H0,leave2t ∪H0,∅,02t ∪H0,2,02t .
Let H1θ2t be the set of all h2t such that there exists a θ with θ < t and θ ≡ 2 mod n,
h2θ ∈ H02θ ∪H0,∅2θ , bidder 2 submitted a bid in period θ and lost in period θ.
Let H0,∅,2,12t be the set of all h2t such that there exists a θ with θ < t, h2θ ∈ H0,∅,22t , and
either (i) θ ≡ 2 mod n and bidder 2 submitted a losing bid or (ii) θ 6≡ 2 mod n and bidder 2
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submitted a losing bid b > 0.
Let H0,2,12t be the set of all h2t such that there exists a θ with θ < t, h2θ ∈ H0,22t , and either
(i) θ ≡ 2 mod n, θ 6= n+ 2, and bidder 2 submitted a losing bid or (ii) bidder 2 submitted a
losing bid b > 0 in period θ (where θ 6≡ 2 mod n or θ = n+ 1).
Let H2θ2t be the set of all h2t such that there exists θ < t for which h2θ ∈ H02θ, and either
(i) θ 6= n+1, θ 6≡ 2 mod n, and bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period θ or (ii) θ = n+2,
h2θ ∈ H0,leave2θ , and bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period θ.
Let H0,∅,θ2t be the set of all h2t such that there exists θ < t for which h2θ ∈ H0,∅2θ , θ 6≡
2 mod n, and bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period θ.
Let H0,∅,2,θ2t be the set of all h2t such that there exists θ < t for which h2θ ∈ H0,∅,22θ ,
θ 6≡ 2 mod n, and bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period θ.
Let H0,2,2,θ2t be the set of all h2t such that there exists θ < t for which h2θ ∈ H0,22θ , and
either (i) θ 6= n + 1, θ 6≡ 2 mod n, and bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period θ or (ii)
θ = n+ 2 and bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period θ.
Stategies
A bidder i ∈ {3, . . . , n} uses the following strategy:
1. In any period t with hit ∈ H0it and t ≡ i mod n, bid zero.
2. In any period t with hit ∈ H0it and t 6≡ i mod n, do not submit a bid.
3. In any period t with hit ∈ H1θit , use the n(t)-competitive bid function.
4. In any period t with hit ∈ H2θit and t > θ > n+2 use a myopic best response against all
bidders j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {i} using the n-competitive bid function, which exists by Lemma
1.
5. In any period t > 2n+ 2 for hit ∈ H2,n+2it , use the n-competitive bid function.
Call the sequence of sets of bidders {1}, {1, 3} \ {i}, {1, 3, 4} \ {i}, . . . , N \ {i, 2, n}, N \
{i, 2}, N \ {i, 2}, N \ {i}, N \ {i}, . . . the “1-sequence” and the sequence of sets of bidders
{2}, {2, 3}\{i}, {2, 3, 4}\{i}, . . . , N \{i, 1, n}, N \{i, 1}, N \{i}, N \{i}, . . . the “2-sequence”.
Denote the kth element of the 1-sequence by s1k, and similarly for the 2-sequence. Let
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ζ = F1(δv
e
1) denote the probability that bidder 1 refrained from bidding in period n + 1.
Therefore, ζ is the probability that following a winning bid by bidder i in period n+1 bidder
i bids against the 1-sequence and 1−ζ is the probability that he bids against the 2-sequence.
Let ξ(hit, ζ) denote the corresponding posterior probability following i’s private history hit.
6. In period t ∈ {n+3, . . . , 2n+2} for hit ∈ H2,n+2it , use the bid function that corresponds
to first period-behavior under the continuation strategy that is a best reply against
beliefs given by ξ(hi,t, ζ).
This best reply can be found recursively as follows: Bidder i’s expected continuation payoff
given his belief ξ(hi,t, ζ) and the realization of his value vit in period t if he bids b in period
is
Vi
(
ξ(hi,t, ζ) , vit
)
= max
b
(
vit − b
)
P (b, ξ(hi,t, ζ))
+δ
∫ vh
0
{
Vi
(
ξ(hi,t ◦ (b, w), ζ), v
)
P (b, ξ(hi,t, ζ))
+Vi
(
ξ(hi,t ◦ (b, l), ζ), v
)
[1− P (b, ξ(hi,t, ζ))]
}
fi(v) dv,
where
P (b, ξ(hi,t, ζ)) :=
ξ(hi,t, ζ) ∏
j∈s1,t−(n+2)
Fj(β
−1
j (b)) + (1− ξ(hi,t, ζ))
∏
j∈s2,t−(n+2)
Fj(β
−1
j (b))
 ,
hi,t ◦ (b, w) denotes the history hi,t followed by a winning bid b, hi,t ◦ (b, l) denotes the
history hi,t followed by a losing bid b, and Vi(ξ(hi,2n+3, ζ), ·) is the present discounted value
of infinitely repeated n-bidder competitive bidding for all hi,2n+3.
Note that it is never optimal to bid above v
h
1−δ as this gives a negative continuation payoff.
Furthermore, observe that in period 2n+2, the bid b does not affect the continuation value,
and hence for any ξ(hi,2n+2, ζ) and any vi,2n+2, Vi
(
ξ(hi,2n+2, ζ) , vi,2n+2
)
is well defined by
Weierstrass’s theorem since we can restrict attention to bids b ∈ [0, vh
1−δ ]. Furthermore, by
Berge’s maximum theorem, Vi
(
ξ(hi,2n+2, ζ) , vi,2n+2
)
is continuous in ξ(hi,2n+2, ζ). Therefore,
the objective function in period 2n + 1 is continuous and recursively applying the above
argument shows that a best response exists in every period t ∈ {n + 3, . . . , 2n + 2} for all
ξ(hit, ζ).
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7. In period n+2 for hit ∈ H2,n+1it , use a best reply against facing bidder 1 with probability
ζ or bidder 2 with probability 1− ζ.
8. In any period t > n + 2 with hit ∈ H2,n+1it , use a myopic best response against all
bidders j ∈ S(n+ 1, t) \ {i} using the n-competitive bid function.
10. In any period t > θ and t 6= n+ 2 for hit ∈ H2,θit , for θ ∈ {3, . . . , n}, use a myopic best
response against all bidders j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {i} using the n(t)-competitive bid function.
11. In period t = n+ 2 for hit ∈ H2,θit , for θ ∈ 3, . . . , n, use a myopic best response against
facing bidder 1 with probability ζ or bidder 2 with probability 1 − ζ, and all bidders
j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {i, 1} for certain, all of whom use the n-competitive bid function.
12. In any period t > 1 for any history hit ∈ H2,1it , use the myopic best response against
all bidders j ∈ S(1, t) \ {i} using the n(t)-competitive bid function.
13. In any period t > 2 and t 6= n + 2 for any history hit ∈ H2,2it , use the myopic best
response against all bidders j ∈ S(2, t) \ {i} using the n(t)-competitive bid function.
14. In period t = n+2 for any history hi,n+2 ∈ H2,2i,n+2, use a myopic best response against
facing bidder 1 with probability ζ and all bidders j ∈ S(2, n + 2) \ {i, 1} for certain,
all of whom use the n-competitive bid function.
Bidder 1 uses the following strategy:
1. In any period t 6= n+ 1 with h1t ∈ H01t and t ≡ 1 mod n, bid zero.
2. In any period t 6= n+ 2 with h1t ∈ H01t and t 6≡ 1 mod n, do not submit a bid.
3. In period t = n+1 with h1,n+1 ∈ H01,n+1 bid 0+ if v1,n+1 ≥ δve1 and do not bid otherwise.
4. In period t = n+ 2 with h1,n+2 ∈ H0,grab1,n+2 do not bid.
5. In period t = n+ 2 with h1,n+2 ∈ H0,leave1,n+2 bid 0.
6. In any period t with h1t ∈ H1θ1t , use the n(t)-competitive bid function.
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7. In any period t 6= n+2 with h1t ∈ H2θ1t , use a myopic best response against all bidders
j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {1} using the n(t)-competitive bid function, which exists by Lemma 1.
8. In period t = n+2 with h1,n+2 ∈ H2θ1,n+2, use a myopic best response against all bidders
j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {1, 2} using the n-competitive bid function, which exists by Lemma 1.
Bidder 2 uses the following strategy:
1. In any period t 6= n+ 2 with h2t ∈ H02t ∪H0,∅2t and t ≡ 2 mod n, bid zero.
2. In any period t 6= n+ 1 with h2t ∈ H02t ∪H0,∅2t and t 6≡ 2 mod n, do not submit a bid.
3. In period t = n+ 1 with h2,n+1 ∈ H02,n+1 bid 0.
4. In period t = n+ 2 with h2,n+2 ∈ H0,grab2,n+2 bid 0.
5. In period t = n+ 2 with h2,n+2 ∈ H0,leave2,n+2 ∪H0,∅2,n+2 do not bid.
6. In any period t with h2t ∈ H1θ2t , use the n(t)-competitive bid function.
7. In any period t 6= n + 2 with h2t ∈ H2θ2t and θ 6= n + 2, use a myopic best response
against all bidders j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {2} using the n(t)-competitive bid function, which
exists by Lemma 1.
8. In any period t with h2t ∈ H2,n+22t use a myopic best response against all bidders
j ∈ {S(θ, t) ∪ {1}} \ {2} using the n-competitive bid function.
9. In period t = n+ 2 with h2,n+2 ∈ H2θ2,n+2 for θ 6= 1, use a myopic best response against
facing bidder 1 with probability ζ and all bidders j ∈ S(θ, t) \ {1, 2} for certain, all
of whom use the n-competitive bid function. Observe that the myopic best response
exists by Lemma 1.
10. In period t = n+ 2 with h2,n+2 ∈ H2,12,n+2 use the n-competitive bid function.
11. In periods t 6≡ 2 mod n with h2,t ∈ H0,22,t refrain from bidding.
12. In periods t ≡ 2 mod n with h2,t ∈ H0,22,t bid as described in the dynamic programming
problem in the final subsection of the appendix, with initial beliefs being equal to
ζ = F1(δv
e
1).
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13. In period t with h2,t ∈ H0,2,12,t use a myopic best response against bidders in the set
S(n+ 1, t) \ {2} using the n-competitive bid function.
14. In period t with h2,t ∈ H0,2,2,n+22,t use a myopic best response against bidders in the set
S(n+ 1, t) \ {2} using the n-competitive bid function.
Let ξ(h2,t, ζ) be bidder 2’s posterior belief following private history h2,t that bidder 1
refrained from bidding in period n+ 1.
15. In period t with h2,t ∈ H0,2,2,θ2,t , θ > n + 2, θ 6≡ 2 mod n use the bid function that
corresponds to first-period behavior under the continuation strategy that is a best
reply against facing the set of bidders S(θ, t) \ {2} with probability ξ(h2,t, µ0) and the
set of bidders S(n+ 1, t) \ {2} with probability 1− ξ(h2,t, µ0).
This best reply is found in a similar manner as described above for a bidder i following
history hit ∈ H2,n+2it . Note that the posterior probability will now depend on the bids
made in periods t ≡ 2 mod n.
16. In period t with h2,t ∈ H0,∅,θ2,t , use a myopic best response against bidders in the set
S(θ, t) \ {2} using the n-competitive bid function.
17. In periods t 6≡ 2 mod n with h2,t ∈ H0,∅,22,t refrain from bidding.
18. In periods t ≡ 2 mod n with h2,t ∈ H0,∅,22,t bid as described in the dynamic programming
problem in the final subsection of the appendix, with initial beliefs being equal to
ζ = F1(δv
e
1).
19. In period t with h2,t ∈ H0,∅,2,12,t use a myopic best response against bidders in the set
S(n+ 1, t) \ {2} using the n-competitive bid function.
20. In period t with h2,t ∈ H0,∅,2,θ2,t , θ > n + 2, θ 6≡ 2 mod n use the bid function that
corresponds to first-period behavior under the continuation strategy that is a best
reply against facing the set of bidders S(θ, t) \ {2} with probability ξ(h2,t, ζ) and the
set of bidders S(n+ 1, t) \ {2} with probability 1− ξ(h2,t, ζ).
21. Bid competitively after all histories h2t ∈ H.
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Beliefs
For all histories hit, i 6= 1, 2 in which bidder i has no evidence of another bidder’s
deviation, his beliefs are derived from Bayes’ rule. The histories hit ∈ H0it in which he does
have such evidence are those in which in some period τ < t with τ 6≡ i mod n he submitted
a bid b > 0 and lost. In these cases we assume that bidder i believes that the bidder j for
whom τ ≡ j mod n bid above b and won and any bidder k 6= j, i did not submit a bid.
For bidder 1, we recall that H01t = H
0,grab
1t ∪ H0,leave1t and make the same assumption.
Note that a losing bid following history h1,n+2 ∈ H0,leave1,n+2 takes bidder 1 out of the sets of
histories H0,leave1t into the sets H
1,n+2
1t .
For bidder 2 we make the same assumption for histories h2t ∈ H02,t ∪H0,∅2,t , except that in
addition after a history in which bidder 2 following h0,leave2,n+2 submitted a bid in period n+ 2
and lost, we assume that he believes bidder 1 bid above b and won and any bidder k 6= 1, 2
did not submit a bid.
For any bidder i 6= 1, 2, following any history hit ∈ H1θit with θ ≥ n and θ 6= 2n bidder i
believes that bidder j with θ+ 1 ≡ j mod n lost in period θ+ 1− n to some bidder k 6= i, j.
Following any history hnt ∈ H1,2nnt bidder n believes that bidder 1 submitted a positive bid
b in period n + 2 following h
0,grab
1t . Following any history hit ∈ H1θit with θ < n, he believes
that bidder 1 lost in the first period because bidder n submitted a bid.
For any bidder i = 1, . . . , n, following any history hit ∈ H2θit bidder i’s beliefs can be
derived from Bayes’ rule for any bid b by bidder i in period t− 1 that is in the range of the
n(t − 1)-competitive bid functions. Provided bidder i won, Bayes’ rule also applies if b is
above the range of the n(t − 1)-competitive bid functions. Otherwise assume that bidder i
believes that one of the bidders who detected his deviation bid above him.
For bidder 1 following any history h1t ∈ H1θ1t with θ ≥ n and θ 6= 2n + 1 bidder 1
believes that bidder j with θ+1 ≡ j mod n lost in period θ+1− n to some bidder k 6= 1, j.
Similarly, following any history h1t ∈ H1,2n+11t in which bidder 1 submitted a winning bid in
period n + 1, bidder 1 believes that bidder 2 lost in period n + 2 to some bidder k 6= 1, 2.
Following any history h1t ∈ H1,2n+11t in which bidder 1 submitted a winning bid in period
n+2, bidder 1 believes that bidder 2 submitted a winning bid in period n+3. Following any
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history h1t ∈ H1,11t , he believes that bidder n submitted the winning bid in the first period.
Following any history h2t ∈ H0,∅,22t bidder 2’s beliefs can be derived from Bayes’ rule with
initial beliefs given by ζ = F1(δv
e
1).
Following any history h2t ∈ H0,∅,θ2t ∪ H0,∅,2,θ2t ∪ H0,2,2,θ2t with θ ≥ n + 2, bidder 2’s beliefs
can be derived from Bayes’ rule for any bid b by bidder i in period t− 1 that is in the range
of the n-competitive bid functions. Provided bidder 2 won, Bayes’ rule also applies if b is
above the range of the n-competitive bid functions. Otherwise assume that bidder 2 believes
that one of the bidders who detected his deviation bid above him.
Following any history h2t ∈ H0,∅,2,12t bidder 2 believes, consistent with Bayes’ rule, to be
bidding against bidders in the set S(n + 1, t) \ {2}, all of whom use the n-competitive bid
function
Following any history h2t ∈ H0,22t bidder 2’s beliefs can be derived from Bayes’ rule with
initial beliefs given by ζ = F1(δv
e
1).
Following any history h2t ∈ H0,2,12t bidder 2 believes, consistent with Bayes’ rule, to be
bidding against bidders in the set S(n + 1, t) \ {2}, all of whom use the n-competitive bid
function
For bidder 2 following any history h2t ∈ H1θ2t with θ ≥ n bidder 2 believes that bidder j
with θ+1 ≡ j mod n lost in period θ+1−n to some bidder k 6= 2, j. Following any history
h2t ∈ H1,22t he believes that bidder 1 lost in the first period because bidder n submitted a
winning bid in the first period.
Optimality
It remains to show that bidders’ strategies are optimal given their beliefs after every
history except those in H.
After any history hit ∈ H0it for any period t 6= n + 1 bidder i faces the choice of bidding
when he is meant to abstain or bidding higher than necessary when he is meant to win.
Submitting a bid in case a bidder is meant to lose only matters if he wins in which case it
induces all rivals to revert to the n-competitive bid function within n periods. As the payoff
from competitive bidding is lower than the payoff from bid rotation, this is unprofitable for
high δ. By the same reasoning no bidder i 6= 1, 2 can gain by submitting a bid in period n+1.
29
Bidder 2 cannot gain from bidding above 0 in period n+1 because with positive probability
he bids above bidder 1 and induces competitive bidding by all rivals within n periods. It is
optimal for bidder 1 to submit a bid 0+ in period n + 1 if and only if v ≥ δve1 because the
difference in his discounted continuation value between losing and winning is δve1, i.e. the
discounted expected value of obtaining the good in period n+ 2 for free.
After any history hit ∈ H1θit bidder i expects that the other bidders use the n(τ)-
competitive bid function for periods τ ≥ t regardless of his own bidding behavior in period
t. Hence it is optimal for him to use the n(t)-competitive bid function in period t, since it is
a myopic best reply.
After any history hit ∈ H2θit ∪H0,∅,θ2t ∪H0,∅,2,12t ∪H0,∅,22t ∪H0,∅,2,θ2t ∪H0,22t ∪H0,2,12t ∪H0,2,2,θ2t ,
it is straightforward to check that the strategies are best replies against the beliefs derived
from Bayes’ rule.
2
Dynamic Programming off the Equilibrium Path
Consider bidder 2 who is uncertain whether either all of his rivals bid competitively or all of
his rivals engage in bid rotation and who assumes that any discovery of a deviation from bid
rotation will result in everyone bidding competitively in no more than n periods. For any
prior belief µ0 < 1 of facing competitive bidding, there is a discount factor δ such that for
any δ > δ bidder 2 will refrain from bidding in periods in which another bidder is designated
to win the object. However in periods, in which he himself is designated to win the object,
he faces a trade-off. He can submit a zero bid in which case he learns with probability one
whether or not everyone else conforms with competitive bidding or put in a positive bid,
which may increase his current payoff at the expense of learning about his rivals. He faces
this decision every n periods and we refer to those periods as decision periods.
Let µk denote bidder 2’s posterior probability at the end of period k−1 of facing compet-
itive bidding and let G(b2,k) denote the probability that b2,k exceeds all other bids when all
of bidder 2’s rivals bid competitively. If bidder 2 places a bid b2,k in the kth decision period
then with probability µk(1−G(b2,k)) he loses in that period, therefore becomes convinced his
rivals bid competitively, and continues with his unique best reply of himself bidding compet-
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itively ever after from the next period on, which earns him a payoff of δvc
1−δ. With probability
1 − µk(1 − G(b2,k)) he wins the object in that period, earns a payoff of (v2,k − b2) in that
period, and enters the next decision period with a posterior µk+1 =
µkG(b)
µkG(b)+1−µk .
Let U := [0, vh]. Denote the bidding rule in the decision period k of a bidder 2 who
won in all previous decision periods by b2,k(·) : Uk → IR and define β2 = {b2,k(·)}∞j=1 . Let
µ(β2, µ0, v
k−1
2 ) be his posterior at the beginning of decision period k conditional on winning
in all prior decision periods, his bidding rule, his prior, and the past realizations of his
valuations. Define
pi(v, µ, b) := [1− µ(1−G(b))](v − b) + δµ(1−G(b)) v
c
1− δ ,
and
ρ(vk2) := µ(β2, µ0, v
k−1
2 )[1−G(b2,k(vk2))].
Then bidder 2’s K-period interim expected payoff from following the bidding rule β2
equals
Υ(β2, v2,1, µ0, K) = pi(v2,1, µ0, b2,1(v
1
2))
+
K∑
k=2
∫
Uk
δ(k−1)×n
[
k−1∏
r=1
(1− ρ(vr2))
]
pi
(
v2,k, µ(β2, µ0, v
k−1
2 ), b2,k(v
k
2)
)
dF2(v2,2) . . . dF(v2,k).
Bidder 2’s interim expected payoff from following the bidding rule β2 equals
Υ(β2, v2,1, µ0) = lim
K→∞
Υ(β2, v2,1, µ0, K).
Since G(·) is the probability that all bidders other than 2 who use the competitive bid
function submit a bid below b2,k and each bidder’s competitive bid function is continuous
and monotone, G(·) is continuous and monotone.
Lemma 2 Let G(·) : [0, vh]→ [0, 1] continuous and monotone. Then the Bellman equation
V (v, µ) = max
b
[1− µ(1−G(b))](v − b) + δµ(1−G(b))
vc
1− δ
+ δn
[1− µ(1−G(b))]2
∫ vh
0
V
(
λ,
µG(b)
µG(b) + 1− µ
)
dF (λ)


has a solution in the space of bounded continuous functions on [0, vh]× [0, 1].
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Proof: Consider the operator T defined by
(TV )(v, µ) = sup
b
[1− µ(1−G(b))](v − b) + δµ(1−G(b))
vc
1− δ
+ δn
[1− µ(1−G(b))]
∫ vh
0
V
(
λ,
µG(b)
µG(b) + 1− µ
)
dF2(λ)


Since the factor multiplying the integral is nonnegative, it is clear that for all bounded
functions V ′, V ′′ on [0, vh] × [0, 1] with V ′(v, µ) ≤ V ′′(v, µ) ∀(v, µ) ∈ [0, vh] × [0, 1], it is
the case that (TV ′)(v, µ) ≤ (TV ′′)(v, µ) for all (v, µ) ∈ [0, vh] × [0, 1]. Hence the operator
T is monotonic. Furthermore, one easily checks that (T (V + a))(v, µ) ≤ (TV )(v, µ) +
δa for all bounded functions V (·, ·) on [0, vh] × [0, 1], a ≥ 0 and (v, µ) ∈ [0, vh] × [0, 1].
Therefore Blackwell’s sufficient condition for a contraction implies that the operator T is
contraction with modulus δ. Simple inspection shows that the operator T maps the space of
bounded continuous functions on [0, vh]× [0, 1] into itself. The space of bounded continuous
functions on [0, vh] × [0, 1] with the sup-norm is a complete metric space. Therefore the
contraction mapping theorem implies that the operator T has a fixed point in this space, i.e.
the functional equation has a unique solution in the class of bounded continuous functions
on [0, vh]× [0, 1].
Since the solution of the functional equation is a continuous function, the supremum is
attained by Weierstrass’s theorem. 2
Let B(v, µ) be set of b˜ such that
b˜ ∈ argmax
b
[1− µ(1−G(b))](v − b) + δµ(1−G(b))
vc
1− δ
+ δn
[1− µ(1−G(b))]
∫ vh
0
V
(
λ,
µG(b)
µG(b) + 1− µ
)
dF (λ)

 .
Let b(v, µ) be a selection from B(v, µ) and note that any such selection is monotonically in-
creasing and therefore measurable. Let µ0 be defined as above and let µk+1(v
k) = µkG(b(vk,µk))
µkG(b(vk,µk))+1−µk .
Let b∗2,k(v
K
2 ) := b(v2,k, µk).
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Lemma 3 The bidding rule β∗2 = {b∗2,k(·)}∞k=1 maximizes Υ(β2, µ0).
Proof: Consider any alternative bidding rule β2. Then
V (v2,1, µ0) ≥ pi(v2,1, µ0, b2,1(v12)) + δn(1− ρ(v12))
∫ vh
0
V
(
v2,2, µ(β2, µ0, v
1
2)
)
dF (v2,2)
≥ pi(v2,1, µ0, b2,1(v12)) + δn(1− ρ(v12))×∫ vh
0
pi(v2,2, µ(β2, µ0, v12), b2,2(v22)) +
δn(1− ρ(v22))
∫ vh
0
V
(
v2,3, µ(β2, µ0, v
2
2)
)
dF (v2,3)
 dF (v2,2)
= pi(v2,1, µ0, b2,1(v
1
2)) + δ
n(1− ρ(v12))
∫ vh
0
pi(v2,2, µ(β2, µ0, v
1
2), b2,2(v
2
2)) dF (v2,2)
+ δ2n(1− ρ(v12))(1− ρ(v22))
∫ vh
0
V
(
v2,3, µ(β2, µ0, v
2
2)
)
dF (v2,3)dF (v2,2)
≥ Υ(β2, v2,1, µ0, K)
+ δKn
[
K∏
r=1
(1− ρ(vr2))
] ∫ vh
0
V
(
v2,K+1, µ(β2, µ0, v
K
2 )
)
dF (v2,K+1) . . . dF (v2,2).
Taking the limit as K →∞, it follows that
V (v2,1, µ0) ≥ Υ(β2, v2,1, µ0).
Replacing β2 above with β
∗
2 , all inequalities become equalities. Hence
Υ(β∗2 , v2,1, µ0) = V (v2,1, µ0) ≥ Υ(β2, v2,1, µ0) ∀β2.
2
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